Katja Yafimava. IAI Working Papers.
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Research Transatlantic Security Symposium - 8. EU, politics and institutions Energy, climate and resources. Natural gas Russia Energy security European Union.
But some go even further, suggesting that NS2 could become excuse for Russian expanded military presence or even military aggression in the Baltic Sea. Once completed the two pipelines would offer 55 billion cubic meters bcm in annual capacity. Together the pipelines would allow for the up to bcm of Russian gas flowing directly to Germany every year.
The company is also constructing the TurkStream pipeline for gas exports from Russia across the Black Sea to Turkey and south eastern Europe. EU adopts French, German compromise on Nord Stream 2 pipeline to Russia Overcoming differences between Paris and Berlin, EU diplomats reached a deal on the pipeline, placing stricter regulations on the project. As the military clash in Ukraine and the conflict between Russia and the West escalates, U. The economic rationale for the project is far from solid because the demand for natural gas in Europe is not growing, but the broadly accepted guidelines in increasing the diversification of supply require the construction of new liquefied natural gas LNG terminals. China's offer to the U.
Instead the companies engaged in the investment by providing financing to the project. According to Gazprom, NS2 would also make gas supply to Europe more secure.
In both instances, Gazprom refused delivery of gas to Ukraine due to disputes over gas pricing and payment of Ukrainian debt. The company decreased the pipeline pressure to allow only the amount of gas contracted by its other European customers. By syphoning the gas for its own purposes, Ukraine made the fulfillment of those obligations impossible.
bbmpay.veritrans.co.id/conocer-mujeres-separadas-en-arza.php With claim to its property, Russia could assert protection by mobilizing special security measures and increase its military presence in the Baltic Sea. The assertion that NS2 could give Russia an excuse for military intervention in the Baltic Sea region assumes that such an intervention is a Russian goal. In the early s Russia supported separatist movements in Georgia and Moldova.
And Russia has direct access to the Baltic Sea via the Kaliningrad Oblast, an administrative region that is completely cut off from the Russian territory and is seen by Russia as strategic in the region. Such a response is much more probable—if not virtually assured—in case of aggression toward a NATO member s. The stakes are too high since by undermining one of NATO guiding principles—collective defense—nonresponse could effectively destroy the entire alliance. At least for now, it seems unlikely that Putin would seek a full-blown conflict, if only for the fact that Russia is objectively a weaker party in a potential conflict with NATO.
At the same time, Russia has seen measurable benefits from activities such as election meddling, media trolling, and disinformation campaigns.
For now, NS2 completion should not make Russian military aggression in the Baltic region any more likely than it otherwise is, at least not in the short to medium term.